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GIFT TAXES-Interest-Free Demand Loans Are Not 
Taxable Gifts-Johnson v. United States* 
Over a period of several years, taxpayer transferred substantial 
amounts of money to his adult son as loans that were repayable on 
demand and did not bear interest.1 The Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue assessed and collected gift taxes on the theory that taxpayer 
had made gifts to his son of the use of the money loaned. The value 
of the gift was asserted to be 3½ per cent of the average unpaid 
balance as of the end of each of the taxable years involved.2 In a 
suit to recover the gift taxes paid, the Federal District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas held for the taxpayer. An interest-free 
loan repayable on demand does not constitute a gift of the value 
of the use of the money loaned. 
Section 2501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 imposes a 
tax on the "transfer of property by gift."3 "Gift" is not defined in 
the Code, but "transfers," which come within the meaning of the 
term gift, are expansively described in section 25ll(a).4 The value 
of a gift is determined according to the procedure outlined in sec-
tion 2512,5 wherein it is specifically noted that if a transfer takes 
the form of an exchange, the amount of the gift for tax purposes shall 
be the amount by which the value of the property surrendered ex-
ceeds the value of the property received. In enacting these sections, 
Congress sought to impose a tax on all transactions which, without 
regard to their formal characterizations, operate to pass property or 
property rights donatively to another. The congressional commit-
tees which reported the original bill expressly disclaimed an intent 
to specify all of the various types of transactions known to the com-
mon law which could be deemed to constitute a taxable event within 
the meaning of the statute.6 Moreover, the Supreme Court, in con-
• 254 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Tex. 1966) [hereinafter referred to as principal case). 
I. The facts have been simplified. The case involved loans by the taxpayer and 
his spouse to their son, daughter, and the daughter's husband. The average yearly 
balance of the son's outstanding loans was approximately $300,000. Similar balances 
for the daughter were $230,000 during the years involved. Principal case at 75-76. 
2. The case involved tax years 1959-1962, inclusive. Plaintiffs stipulated however 
that they had made loans consistently, beginning sometime before the year 1952. Prin-
cipal case at 74. In assigning a value to the right to use money, the Government 
selected the factor of 3½% from the regulations providing for the valuation of 
annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders, and reversions, stating: "We think 
the use of 3½ per cent as the value of the use of the taxpayer's money was suitably 
conservative, and the taxpayers apparently agree since they have not disagreed with 
the amount of the gifts if such there were." Brief for Defendant, p. 17. See Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2512-5 (1958). 
3. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2501. 
4. !NT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2511(a). See also Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-l(a) 8c (c) (1958). 
5. !NT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2512, 
6. See H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-28 (1932): 
f11he aim in framing this title has been to state with brevity and in general terms 
the provisions of a substantive character. 
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struing the gift tax provisions, has repeatedly emphasized that Con-
gress was not concerned with refinements of title, but rather with 
the passage of control over economic benefits of property having 
exchangeable value and for which full value was not returned.7 The 
fact that, with the exception of transactions made in the ordinary 
course of business, every completed inter vivos transfer for less than 
"adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth" is 
subject to the gift tax8 indicates that, regardless of the form chosen, 
Congress intended that the gratuitous transfer to another of a valu-
able property right would be taxed as a gift no later than the point 
in time when the right conferred could no longer be recovered by 
the transferor. 9 
The transaction in the principal case in effect transferred the 
taxpayer's right to earn income on his capital to his son, and no 
value in "money or money's worth" was given for the receipt of 
this right. While admittedly the son did not receive any measurable 
benefit at the time the loan was transacted, he did receive possession 
of an income-producing asset belonging to another without either 
having the duty to account for the income therefrom or promising 
The terms "property," "transfer,'' "gift," and "indirectly" are used in the 
broadest and most comprehensive sense; the teim "property" reaching every species 
of right or interest protected by law and having exchangeable value. 
The words "transfer • • • by gift" and "whether • • • direct or indirect" are 
designed to cover and comprehend all transactions (subject to certain express 
conditions and limitations) whereby, and to the extent (sec. 503) that, property 
or a property right is donatively passed to or conferred upon another, regardless 
of the means or the device employed in its accomplishment. 
The passage is repeated verbatim, S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1932). See 
also Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). 
7. Almost without exception the cases construing the gift tax rely in whole or in 
part on the decision in Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933). See also Com-
misioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1945); Robinette v. Helvering, 318 U.S. 184, 
187 (1943); Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943); Estate of Sanford v. Com-
missioner, 308 U.S. 39, 43 (1939); cf. Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930). 
8. The exclusion for transactions in the ordinary course of business is contained 
in Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-8 (1958). This language of "adequate and full consideration in 
money or money's worth" has been relied upon as an additional ground to support 
the assertion that Congress intended to impose the tax in any case where the parties 
to a transfer do not deal as if they were strangers. Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 
303 (1945). For this purpose, "ordinary course of business" is defined by the regulations 
as "a transaction which is bona fide, at arm's length, and free from any donative 
intent" and is somewhat broader than the "ordinary course of business" concept of 
§ 162. 5 MERTENS, FEDERAL GIFT&: EsTATE TAXATION § 34.19 (1959). See also Rosenthal v. 
Co=issioner, 205 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1953). 
9. See note 6 supra. That the tax was intended to apply to continuing interests as 
well as to outright and absolute gifts is evidenced by the following statement appearing 
in the committee reports. Note, however, that the illustration was offered by way of 
example and not as a limitation. 
For example ••• (7) where A creates a revocable trust naming B as beneficiary, a 
gift to B of the corpus is effected when A relinquishes the power to revoke or the 
power is otherwise terminated in B's favor (the income payments to B in the 
interim being gifts from A in the calendar years when received). 
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 40 
(1932). 
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to give value for the right to use the asset. So long as tax.payer per-
mitted his son to retain possession of that asset (by refraining from 
exercising his right to demand payment), the son was in a position 
to realize upon the income rights which attached to the transferred 
capital.10 Although it may be said that the benefit thus conferred 
upon the son was subtle and elusive, the complexity of any particular 
arrangement ought not to determine the applicability of the tax 
laws.11 
An analogy may be made to a transaction which, at least in a 
family setting, is substantially equivalent to the transaction involved 
in the principal case. Assume that a father gives his son $100,000 
in exchange for the son's promise to repay that amount in five 
years and that the parties mutually agree that the loan will not 
bear interest. Unless the transaction is one in the ordinary course 
of business,12 the Internal Revenue Service is bound to examine 
the exchange in order to determine whether any part of it consti-
tutes the making of a gift.18 Even assuming that there is no ques-
tion of the son's ability to repay the loan at maturity,1¼ a present 
promise to pay $100,000 at the end of five years is patently not 
worth $100,000 at the time of the promise. Presumably, under 
section 2512(b), the father will be deemed to have made a gift of 
the difference between $100,000 and the present value of the prom-
ise to pay $100,000 at the end of five years.15 Admittedly, the trans-
10. The passage of a taxable benefit does not depend upon enrichment resulting 
to the donee by reason of the transfer. Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1958). Thus, the 
argument that the borrower might not realize upon the potential right to earn income 
from the possession of capital is seemingly misdirected. 
11. See, e.g., Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 180 (1943). 
12. Nothing herein should be taken to suggest that family members cannot deal 
at arm's length. The fact is that on occasion they do. The argument is only that absent 
a showing that the transaction being considered is in fact arm's length-that is, an 
ordinary business exchange-the transaction is generally presumed to be one of gift 
and therefore subject to "special scrutiny." See, e.g., Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 
106 (1950); Commissioner v. Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 291 (1946); Helvering v. Clifford, 309 
U.S. 331, 335 (1940). 
13. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 2512(b). The value to be used for purposes of com-
parison are the present values of the respective property interests exchanged. Treas. 
Reg. § 25.2512-1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 682, 1965-2 CUM • .BULL. 367; cf. Treas. Reg. 
§§ 25.2512-4 &: -5 (1958). See also G. H . .Blackbum, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). 
14. Absent a finding that the son is able to repay at maturity, there would arguably 
be a gift at the time of the loan of the full amount transferred. Selsor R. Haygood, 42 
T.C. 936 (1964); Minnie E. Deal, 29 T.C. 730 (1958). 
15. The question was raised in the principal case in the government's brief. Brief 
for Defendant, pp. 16-17 &: n.13. The government takes this question as settled, on 
authority of Lockard v, Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948), which held that a 
beneficiary's irrevocable right to receive the income of a short-term trust constituted 
a taxable gift in the year the property was transferred to the trust. G. H. Blackbum, 
20 T.C. 204 (1953), is the strongest authority for the proposition that the transaction 
of a term loan at less than fair market interest is a gift. In that case, the Tax Court 
upheld the Commissioner's assertion of a gift on the ground that the fair market value 
of the secured note given by the transferees was only $134,538.30. While the note 
carried a face amount of $172,517.65, it required interest payments of only 2¼%, The 
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action in the principal case can be distinguished from the hypo-
thetical in that the former loan is repayable on demand. However, 
the court held that no gift had been made at the time of the loan, 
or at any time thereafter, which suggests the somewhat suspicious 
rule that interest-free term loans are subject to gift taxation under 
section 2512(b), while interest-free demand loans are not. The dis-
tinction between term and demand obligation may be valid in the 
market, but it clearly is inappropriate where the lender and the 
borrower are not dealing at arm's length.16 In all probability, a 
father who wishes to transfer a property right to his son through 
the use of an interest-free loan will be unconcerned with whether 
the loan is technically repayable at a definite time, or alternatively, 
on demand. In fact, it would appear that where the desire and ability 
to give are strongest, so too will be the tendency to loan interest-
free money on a demand basis. If one form will result in the imposi-
tion of the gift tax whereas the other will not, surely the parties 
will adopt the latter. Previous characterizations of gift and non-gift 
transactions have not rested on a distinction so slender as that sug-
gested here, and therefore if the transaction of a term loan at less 
than fair market interest constitutes a gift transfer, so should the 
transaction of a demand loan. 
The form utilized in the principal case may also be compared 
with the revocable trust of cash. Both may be employed to confer 
upon another the continuing, but defeasible, right to enjoy the in-
come from the taxpayer's donated capital.17 The beneficiary of the 
revocable trust is deemed to receive a separate gift each calendar 
year as distributions of income are made by the trustee.18 However, 
reduction of the fair market value of the note was occasioned by the court's finding 
that notes of similar character required interest payments of at least 4%, 
16. The transaction of a demand loan has not been viewed as an economic device 
to pass wealth. This conclusion is based on the assumption that a lender dealing at 
arm's length will demand interest commensurate with the value of the benefit con-
ferred-the right to use capital. Where the parties to the loan are related, the assump• 
tion may or may not be warranted and the absence of an obligation to pay interest 
(or some other consideration in lieu thereof) would seem to indicate that a gift is 
intended. When a transaction taking the form of a demand loan does not conform to 
the economic assumptions for which it has been recognized, there is no reason to give 
religious adherence to the form. 
17. The taxpayer's capital is "donated" in the case of the interest-free demand 
loan in the sense that the taxpayer has not exacted from his borrower payment for 
the benefit which has been conferred. Few taxpayers would be so foolish as to argne 
that they would loan money to all comers on these terms, yet that seems precisely the 
standard which Congress had in mind when related taxpayers purport to deal at 
arm's length. See Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 306 (1945); Treas. Reg. 
§ 25.2512·1 (1958), as amended, T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CUM, BULL. 367; Treas. Reg. § 25.-
2512-8 (1958); cf. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-4 (1958). 
18, Treas. Reg.§ 25.2511-2(f) (1958) provides in part: 
The receipt of income or of other enjoyment of the transferred property by the 
transferee or by the beneficiary (other than by the donor himself) during the 
interim between the making of the initial transfer and the relinquishment or 
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according to the holding in the principal case, the recipient of an 
interest-free loan will not be deemed to have received any taxable 
gift in any of the years during which the loan was allowed to re-
main outstanding. It is suggested that since both the revocable trust 
and the demand loan afford a means by which a taxpayer can 
transfer gratuitously the enjoyment of capital, and since refinements 
of title are not to control the incidence of the gift tax,19 the result 
in the principal case is highly questionable. Indeed, since the 
interest-free demand loan accomplishes purposes equivalent in sub-
stance to both the revocable trust and the interest-free term loan 
described above, imposition of the tax would seem to follow from 
the bare requirement of consistent application of the gift tax. 
It might be argued that if a transaction is to constitute a taxable 
gift, it must qualify as such at the time of the transaction. Admit-
tedly, the gift tax is an excise levied upon the donor's act of making 
an absolute transfer20 and it cannot be levied on a defeasible transfer 
or the transfer of a mere expectancy. Since the right accorded the 
borrower of an interest-free demand loan (the free use of capital 
at the will of the lender) can have only prospective value, the nego-
tiation of such a loan is thus not a completed transfer for purposes 
of the gift tax. In such a case, if the tax is to apply, it can be only 
termination of the power operates to free such income or other enjoyment from 
the power, and constitutes a gift of such income or of such other enjoyment 
taxable as of the calendar year of its receipt. 
The substance of this rule was originally contained in a regulation (itself limited to 
the revocable trust) adopted to implement the gift tax enacted in 1924. See Burnet v. 
Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280, 283 (1933). Congress incorporated that regulation (continuing 
to limit its application to revocable trusts) into the Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, 
§ 50l(c), 47 Stat. 245: 
(c) The tax shall not apply to a transfer of property in trust where the power to 
revest in the donor title to such property is vested in the donor, either alone or in 
conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the 
disposition of such property or the income therefrom, but the relinquishment or 
termination of such power (other than by the donor's death) shall be considered 
to be a transfer by the donor by gift of the property subject to such power, and 
any payment of the income therefrom to a beneficiary other than the donor shall 
be considered to be a transfer by the donor of such income by gift. 
This section was repealed by the Congress after the Supreme Court suggested in 
Burnet v. Guggenheim that the principles contained therein were already a part of 
the law. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, § 511, 48 Stat. 758; see H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1934); S. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1934), both of which 
state: "This section repeals section 50l(c) of the Revenue Act of 1932, since the prin-
ciple expressed in that section is now a fundamental part of the law by virtue of the 
Supreme Court's decision in the Guggenheim case (288 U.S. 280)." Despite these 
developments, the rule was successfully challenged in Estate of Mead, 41 B.T .A. 424 
(1940), appeal dismissed, 116 F.2d 278, nonacq., 1942-1 CuM. BULL. 27. The rule was 
reaffirmed in Commissioner v. Warner, 127 F-2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1942), reversing 42 
B.T .A. 954 (1940). The Board of Tax Appeals expressly repudiated the departure of 
Mead in Leonard A. Yerkes, 47 B.T.A. 433 (1942). 
19. See authorities cited supra note 7. 
20. Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(a) (1958). 
See also Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1051 (1960); Estate of Koert Bartman, IO 
T.C. 1073 (1948); Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 44 (1939), 
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after continued possession of the principal and the passage of time 
have combined to accord the borrower an interest capable of actu-
arial valuation. The question becomes at what point or points in 
time can it be said that a taxable interest has been "transferred" by 
the lender. The problem may be illustrated by again comparing 
the interest-free demand loan with the interest-free term loan. Sup-
pose that a taxpayer makes two loans of equal amount on January 
1, 1967: one repayable on demand to his son, the other repayable 
on December 31, 1967, to his daughter. Both loans are bona fide21 
but neither carries interest. The loan to the daughter is a complete 
and taxable transfer on January 1, 1967, the date of its negotiation,22 
whereas the loan to the son is not a completed transfer and there-
fore not taxable at the time it is made. Now suppose that the son 
repays his loan on December 31, 1967, the same day repayment is 
made by the daughter. Both borrowers have enjoyed the use of 
their father's capital for a period of one year. No doubt the value 
of the right to use money on a demand basis is somewhat less than 
the value of the right to use the same amount of money for a fixed 
period. However, that does not bear on the completeness of the 
transfer effected by the father in these two hypothetical transactions. 
In each case, by the close of the year, the father has irrevocably con-
ferred a valuable right during calendar year 1967. For purposes 
of reporting taxable gifts transferred during 1967, it would appear 
irrelevant that in one case the extent of the gift was fixed on the 
first day of the year, while in the other the extent of the gift could 
not be finally determined until the last day of that year. Moreover, 
it should be clear that the extent of the interest passed from father 
to son during 1967 does not depend upon the fact that the loan 
was repaid before the close of that year.23 Even if the loan were not 
repaid on December 31, 1967, but rather was allowed to remain 
outstanding into 1968, that cannot affect the extent of the benefit 
conferred during 1967. So long as the benefit derived cannot be 
recalled by the father, the transfer to the son is in effect complete.24 
21, That is, both borrower and lender intend that the principal amount will be 
repaid according to the terms of the loan. 
22, See note 15 supra summarizing the case of G. H. Blackbum, 20 T.C. 204 (1953), 
apparently the only case to consider the question to date. Note that in that case the 
court upheld the Commissioner's assertion of gift tax deficiency to the extent of the 
discrepancy between the rate of interest actually payable by the borrower (2¼%) and 
the rate that would have been demanded in the open market for similarly secured 
notes (4%), To the extent that the Blackburn case is followed, it is authority for trucing 
both interest-free and low-interest term loans as transactions involving a taxable gift. 
23. Where the property right being considered is the interest-free use of the lender's 
capital on a demand basis, the benefit commences upon the transfer of the money and 
continues, day by day, until the loan is repaid. 
24. It should be noted that an argument that the transfer was incomplete with 
respect to any past period would presuppose that the lender has a legal right to 
payment for a period between negotiation of the loan and demand. This argument 
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No doubt it would be easier to await repayment of the son's loan 
and to determine the extent of the benefit for the whole period of 
the loan, but Congress intended the tax to be levied annually.211 
Therefore, if the tax is to apply to interest-free demand loans at all, 
it appears that it must apply no later than the close of any year 
during which such a loan is made, and be valued according to the 
length of time the loan was outstanding during that year.26 Any 
other construction would introduce hopeless inconsistencies into 
the application of the gift tax.27 
It remains to assign a value to the benefit which results from 
the interest-free use of money. When the right to be valued is the 
use of money for a fixed period, the measure has generally been 
the rate of interest for similar obligations in the local market.28 
When the right at issue is the use of money for an indefinite period, 
the value should therefore be set at the rate of interest that prevails 
for similar demand obligations. Absent a reliable market for de-
mand obligations, it will be necessary to use some other, more 
readily determined, interest factor (such as, for example, the average 
prime rate during the period or the average bank rate on one-year 
would conflict with the basic contention, necessary to the lender's case, that there is a 
loan which the law will recognize as interest-free. Further, it would presumably result 
in finding that the lender had forgiven legally owing interest payments. Note the 
district court's seeming preoccupation with this analysis in the principal case at 77. 
25. INT. REv. ConE OF 1954, § 2501. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.25l1-2(a)-(f) (1958), See also 
the legislative history to the Revenue Act of 1932 in S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 40-41 (1932), stating: "For a more effective administration and to secure prompt 
collection of the revenues, the bill provides that the tax shall be collected annually." 
26. There is no direct authority for this type of gift tax treatment save that which 
may be drawn from the broad language used by the congressional committees in 1932 
in introducing the original bill embodying the present gift tax law. See excerpts from 
H.R. REP. No. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1932); S. REP. No. 665, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 
40 (1932), quoted supra notes 6, 9. The only situation there envisioned by Congress 
wherein a transferee would receive the revocable right to enjoy the income from the 
transferor's donated capital was in connection with the trust. The committee reports 
specifically provided for the imposition of the tax on income payments actually made 
to a beneficiary without regard to the fact that the income interest (as distinguished 
from payments of income) is revocable. There is no reason to suppose that the congres-
sional committees intended to limit the tax on interests received or enjoyed in 
connection with defeasible transfers to trusts, but, on the other hand, the courts have 
not had occasion (before the principal case) to deal with such interests outside of the 
trust area. The third sentence of Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(£) (1958), obviously con-
templates imposition of tax on benefits received under non-trusted revocable transfers, 
but apparently it has not been employed outside of the trust framework: 
The receipt of income or of other enjoyment of the transferred property by the 
transferee or by the beneficiary (other than by the donor himself) during the 
inte~m !=-etween the making of the initial tra~sfer and the relinquishment or 
termmauon of the power operates to free such income or other enjoyment from 
the power, and constitutes a gift of such income or of such other enjoyment 
taxable as of the calendar year of its receipt. 
This language was rejected without comment by the court in the principal case. 
Zl. The inconsistency of taxing term loans as gifts while allowing demand loans to 
go untaxed has already been noted. See note 16 supra and accompanying text. 
28. G. H. Blackbum, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). 
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obligations).29 Reference can perhaps be made to section 483, which 
was added to the income tax provisions of the Code by the Revenue 
Act of 1964.30 That section attributes interest to payments made • 
under certain contracts for the sale or exchange of property when 
payment is deferred and interest is either unstated or fixed at an 
unreasonably low rate. Pursuant to the current Treasury Regula-
tions, a deferred payment contract which does not provide for at least 
four per cent simple interest will be deemed, in effect, to require 
payment of five per cent interest compounded semiannually.31 Stated 
simply, section 483 imputes interest to transactions which would 
normally require payment of interest, without regard to the fact 
that the parties to the contract have expressly agreed that no interest 
will be paid.32 Although income tax provisions are not often used 
29. In J. Simpson Dean, 35 T.C. 1083 (1961), the Commissioner attacked the trans-
action of an interest-free loan to principal shareholders, claiming that such a loan 
constituted income or a dividend. To value the benefit, the Commissioner initially used 
the legal rate of interest. Before trial, however, the current prime interest rate was 
substituted. The court did not reach the valuational question. See Comment, 33 
U. CHI. L. REv. 346 (1966). 
30. Revenue Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 19. Permanent regulations were promulgated in 
T .D. 6873, 1966-1 CUM . .BULL. 101. 
31. Treas. Reg. §§ l.483-l(c)(2), -l(d)(2) (1966). 
32. Section 483 was designed to prevent a seller from converting interest income 
into capital gains. See § 483(£)(3). Consider the application of § 483 to cases in which the 
absence of interest charges is explained by the generosity of the seller rather than by 
the so-called "time-price differential." A loan unassociated with a transfer of property 
other than cash would probably not be considered a "sale or exchange of property" 
within § 483 and therefore § 483 probably does not apply to the facts of the principal 
case. Consider however the application of § 483 to a transfer of property in exchange 
for interest-free or low interest notes, as in G. H • .Blackbum, 20 T.C. 204 (1953). See 
Treas. Reg. § I.483-l(b)(6), examples (4) &: (6) (1966). The provisions of § 483 seem to 
apply unless the taxpayer argues that he has made a gift of interest. The transfer of 
property (not excluded by § 483(£)(3)) having a fair market value of $100,000 may be 
from a father to his son in exchange for the son's interest-free note for $100,000. If 
§ 483 applies, the father will be forced to recognize interest income, the son would be 
allowed a § 163(a) interest deduction, and the father will suffer an unrecognizable loss, 
§ 267(a). To illustrate, assume such a transfer is made and that the father's basis in 
the property is $100,000, payment on the note being made in full four years after the 
sale: 
(a) Sum of payments to which § 483 applies $100,000 
(b) Value of $100,000 due 4 years from date of sale, Treas. Reg. 
§ 1.483-I(g), Table I (1966), 45-51 mos: .82075 
Total unstated interest 
82,075 
$ 17,925 
To the father the payment consists of: 
(I) Return of capital $ 82,075 
(2) Interest income 17,925 
Total payment $100,000 
The father will have an unrecognizable loss, § 267(a), of $17,925 and the son will be 
allowed an interest deduction, § 163(a), of $17,925. It is difficult to conclude that this 
result was intended or contemplated by the Congress in enacting § 483, but the statute 
does not seem to afford an "out." If interest were stated at 4%, taxpayer could utilize 
the § 2503(b) exclusion and report a taxable gift of $1,000 per year by forgiving 
annual interest payments. See also INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § l63(b), imputing interest 
for purposes of deduction of 6% on the average unpaid balance under certain contracts 
for the purchase of personal property or educational services. 
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in connection with gift tax cases, when the gift tax question involves 
the rate of interest which the market demands, it would seem that 
the regulations to section 483 are, at least, an administrative pro-
nouncement of which the court should take cognizance. Whatever 
interest factor is selected should bear some reasonable relation to 
the market existing during the period over which the right was en-
joyed.88 Moreover, a taxpayer who objects to the rate selected by 
the government should be permitted to prove that the use of a 
lower interest rate would be more reasonable. In the principal case, 
the government chose to value the right at 3½ per cent per annum, 
selecting that figure from the regulations dealing with the valuation 
of annuities, life estates, terms for years, remainders, and rever-
sions. 84 Since these regulations are designed to allow determination 
of the present value of a right to be enjoyed in the future, it might 
be argued that the figure is not applicable to the valuation of a right 
enjoyed in the calendar year concluded at the time the return is 
filed. If this was an error, however, the taxpayer was not heard to 
complain that the rate selected was too low. No doubt a regulation 
on point would aid a court in resolving this question, but the absence 
of such a regulation should not prevent a court from setting the 
value of the benefit to be taxed. 
As a practical matter, the question does not seem to be whether 
interest-free intra-family loans will be brought within the taxing 
statutes, but rather by what means and in what manner. If, on the 
basis of the decision in the principal case, demand loans will escape 
the gift tax entirely, then it may be expected that they will become a 
common vehicle for avoidance of tax.85 A substantial benefit may 
thus be passed from the lender to the borrower by the use of no-
interest or low-interest loans. When the parties are closely related, 
the integrity of the gift tax seems to require that "fair market in-
terest" be imputed to the transaction and in this regard it should be 
irrelevant ( except for determining the tax period during which the 
gift is to be reported) that the loan is payable on demand or on a 
date certain.86 
33. See, e.g., Camp v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 999, 1004 (1st Cir. 1952); Commissioner 
v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 943, 945-47 (2d Cir. 1942). 
34. Treas. Reg. § 25.2512-5 (1958). 
35. But see INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2503(b), allowing a single taxpayer an exclusion 
from the gift tax, per donee. Using the 3½% factor urged by the government in the 
principal case, this exclusion could be employed by a taxpayer to allow, free from gift 
tax, interest-free loans somewhat in excess of $85,000 per donee-borrower, and so long 
as the statutory exclusion were not used for other purposes, only those loans exceeding 
$85,000 per donee would be subject to the gift tax. 
36. The Government will not appeal the decision in the principal case. 2 CCH 
1966 FED. EsT. &: GIFT TAX REP. 9006. 
The interest-free loan (whether term or demand) raises some interesting income 
tax questions. In the principal case, the facts demonstrate that taxpayer succeeded 
in splitting his income with his children. Throughout the four years in question the 
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taxpayer's loans exceeded $500,000. Assuming an interest rate of 4%, the taxpayer 
escaped income taxes on $20,000 per year. Admittedly the taxpayer could leave his 
capital idle, but little reason appears to suppose that the $500,000 did remain idle. 
Indeed, the opinion of the district court suggests that the money was profitably invested 
by the borrowers. Principal case at 77. The income-shifting potential of interest-free 
loans has not been attacked by the Service, and it is doubtful that there is existing 
doctrine sufficient to meet the threat. A Note, 25 J. TAX. 358 (1966), recognizes the 
issue, and suggests that it belongs to the field of imputed income. The issue is perhaps 
more easily understood by reference to Code provisions charging the granter with the 
income of short term and revocable trusts. See INT. R.Ev. CODE OF 1954, §§ 673(a), 676(a). 
These provisions are designed to prevent the use of the trust device to transfer the 
income potential of a settler's capital except where the settler also passes an interest 
in the corpus sufficient to justify separate income treatment to the beneficiary. The 
result in the principal case at least suggests that a taxpayer can successfully split 
income with members of his family by surrendering no more than the immediate 
possession of his cash-by an interest-free demand loan. If the policies which led to 
the enactment of§§ 673 and 676 are viable, then those same policies would suggest that 
the reasoning of the principal case cannot be expected to endure. 
